The Western Balkans — a term covering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia — have been EU accession candidates in varying stages for over two decades. The process has been slow, repeatedly disrupted by internal political crises and bilateral disputes, and at times openly frustrated by EU member states reluctant to move the queue forward. But the region has not gone away, and events there continue to matter for European security and policy.
Where EU accession stands
Montenegro and Serbia are the most advanced in formal accession negotiations, having opened chapters years ago. Neither is close to completing the process. Montenegro has made progress on rule of law chapters — the central condition for advancement — but governance instability and coalition fragility have slowed implementation. Serbia's accession process has been effectively paused at the EU level due to the bloc's position on Serbia's refusal to align with EU sanctions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. That impasse has not been formally resolved.
Albania and North Macedonia were long blocked by bilateral disputes — North Macedonia's constitutional name issue with Greece, and Albania's rule of law record. Both began formal negotiations after clearing those hurdles, though progress is incremental. Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained candidate status in 2022 but faces deep internal division — the country's constitutional structure, which distributes power among ethnic communities under the Dayton framework, makes the kinds of legislative reforms required for accession very difficult to pass.
Kosovo's distinct situation
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008 — a declaration recognised by most EU member states but not by Serbia, Russia, China, or five EU members (Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus). This makes Kosovo's EU accession path fundamentally different from the others: it cannot progress normally while its statehood is unrecognised by part of the EU itself. Tensions along the Kosovo-Serbia border have flared periodically, most recently in the northern municipalities with large Serb populations. EU-mediated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina has produced agreements that have not been implemented. The situation is stable in the sense that there is no active armed conflict, but it remains unresolved.
Why this matters for Poland and the EU
Poland has historically been a supporter of Western Balkans enlargement — not from a purely altruistic position, but because Polish foreign policy has long viewed EU and NATO expansion as integral to European stability. A Western Balkans that remains outside the EU's regulatory and institutional orbit is one where other external actors — Russia, China, Turkey — can exercise disproportionate influence. Several Balkan states have been the subject of documented Russian disinformation campaigns and political interference, and Chinese infrastructure investment through Belt and Road initiatives has been significant in some countries.
EU enlargement is also a political statement about the bloc's credibility. Having promised accession perspectives for two decades and delivered nothing for any country in the region, the EU faces a credibility problem that affects its ability to use the enlargement carrot as a reform incentive. The European Commission has been explicit about this, and the new enlargement commissioner has signalled that the process needs to be made more credible — though what that means in practice is still being worked out.
What to watch
The most likely near-term development is incremental: one or two more accession chapters opened with one or two countries, some progress in Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, and continued slow movement on rule of law benchmarks. A breakthrough that puts any country close to membership in the next five years would require political decisions in member states — particularly those in the EU that have been most sceptical — that do not currently appear imminent. The region matters; the process moves slowly.